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Abstract:	   Derived	   from	   the	   Latin	   Victoria,	   which	   itself	   can	   be	   traced	   to	   vino	  
victus,	   meaning	   ‘to	   conquer’,	   victory	   evokes	   a	   number	   of	   close	   synonyms,	  principally	  conquest	  and	  triumph.	  	  It	  occupies	  an	  ambivalent	  position	  in	  respect	  of	  contemporary	  war.	  	  Though	  in	  some	  regards	  a	  concept	  that	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  combat,	  the	  notion	  of	  winning	  wars	  has	  acquired	  an	  ironic	  ring	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  two	  brutal	  world	  wars	  and	  the	  advent	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  Victory	  in	  war	  is	  clearly	  a	  contentious	  subject.	  	  Yet	  scholars	  of	  the	  just	  war	  tradition	  have	  largely	   ignored	   it.	   	   This	   article	   fills	   that	   breach	   by	   asking	   what,	   if	   anything,	  victory	  can	  mean	  in	  relation	  to	   just	  war?	   	   It	  argues	  that	  victory	  has	  an	  aporetic	  quality	  insofar	  as	  it	  appears	  both	  integral	  to	  but	  incompatible	  with	  the	  just	  war	  ethos.	  	  As	  such,	  it	  reveals	  both	  the	  limits	  and	  possibilities	  of	  just	  war	  thinking.	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Introduction	  ‘War’s	   very	   object	   is	   victory,	   not	   prolonged	   indecision’,	   General	   Douglas	  MacArthur	  once	   famously	  declared.	   	   ‘In	  war	   there	   is	  no	  substitute	   for	  victory’.1	  	  Indeed,	   ever	   since	  Aristotle	  defined	  victory	   as	   the	   telos	  of	  military	   science,	   the	  idea	   that	   war	   is	   all	   about	   winning	   has	   been	   deeply	   lodged	   in	   the	   popular	  imaginary.2	   	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  many	  people	  have	  queried	  whether	  victory	  is	  an	  appropriate	   term	   to	   apply	   to	  modern	  war.	   	   Aristide	   Briand,	   Prime	  Minister	   of	  France	  for	  periods	  either	  side	  of	  the	  Great	  War,	  remarked:	  ‘In	  modern	  war	  there	  is	  no	  victor.	   	  Defeat	  reaches	  out	   its	  heavy	  hand	  to	   the	  uttermost	  corners	  of	   the	  earth,	   and	   lays	   its	   burdens	  on	  victor	   and	  vanquished	   alike’.3	   	  Writing	   after	   the	  Second	   World	   War,	   Basil	   Liddell	   Hart	   observed	   that	   nuclear	   weapons	   had	  rendered	  traditional	  strategic	  principles	  nonsensical:	   ‘To	  aim	  at	  winning	  a	  war,	  to	  take	  victory	  as	  your	  object,	  is	  no	  more	  than	  a	  state	  of	  lunacy’.4	  	  Victory	  in	  war	  is	  clearly	  an	  important	  subject	  that	  elicits	  strong	  views	  and	  little	  consensus.	  	  But	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ideal	  of	  just	  war,	  the	  principal	  western	  frame	  for	  thinking	  about	  the	  rights	  and	  wrongs	  of	  warfare?	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  ‘Farewell	  Address	  to	  Congress,	  19	  April	  1951’.	  	  At:	  http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurfarewelladdress.htm.	  	  Accessed:	  12	  November	  2013.	  2	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  trans.	  by	  Harris	  Rackham	  (London:	  Wordsworth	  Classics,	  1996),	  p.	  3.	  	  Also:	  Cicero,	  The	  Republic	  and	  The	  Laws,	  trans.	  by	  Niall	  Rudd	  (Oxford;	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  p.	  83.	  3	  Quoted	  in:	  Richard	  Hobbs,	  The	  Myth	  of	  Victory:	  What	  is	  Victory	  in	  War?	  (Boulder:	  Westview,	  1979),	  p.	  477.	  4	  Quoted	  in:	  Beatrice	  Heuser,	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Strategy:	  Thinking	  War	  from	  
Antiquity	  to	  the	  Present	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  p.	  454.	  	  Bernard	  Brodie	  argued	  that	  where	  thus	  far	  the	  chief	  purpose	  of	  military	  establishments	  had	  been	  to	  ‘win	  wars’,	  its	  main	  aim	  from	  now	  on	  must	  be	  to	  ‘avert	  them’.	  	  Bernard	  Brodie,	  The	  Absolute	  Weapon	  (New	  York:	  Harcourt	  Brace,	  1946),	  p.	  76.	  	  Kenneth	  Waltz	  similarly	  disavowed	  victory:	  ‘in	  war	  there	  is	  no	  victory,	  but	  only	  varying	  degrees	  of	  defeat’.	  	  Kenneth	  Waltz,	  Man,	  The	  State,	  and	  
War:	  A	  Theoretical	  Analysis	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  p.	  1.	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   It	  is	  a	  propitious	  moment	  to	  ask	  what	  victory	  may	  mean	  in	  relation	  to	  just	  war.	   	   Commentators	   on	   the	   current	   conflict	   in	   Gaza	   have	   noted	   that	   there	   is	  uncertainty	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  divide	  over	  what	  would	  constitute	  victory	  in	  this	  most	   bitter	   of	   struggles.5	   	   Recent	   efforts	   to	   terminate	   conflicts	   in	   Afghanistan,	  Iraq,	  and	  Libya	  have	  also	  been	  hampered	  not	  only	  by	  poor	  planning	  and	  errors	  of	  judgement,	   but	   also	   by	   a	   lack	   of	   clarity	   pertaining	   to	   what	   victory	   requires.6	  	  These	  shortcomings	  are	  understandable	  when	  set	  against	  their	  strategic	  context.	  	  Following	   fifty	   years	   of	   Cold	  War	   standoff,	   many	   observers	   have	   simply	   been	  caught	  off-­‐guard	  by	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  the	  use	  of	  military	  force	  as	  an	  element	  of	  statecraft	  and	  vital	  concern	  for	  international	  society.	  	  While	  just	  war	  scholars	  have	   responded	   to	   this	   development	   by	   devoting	   attention	   to	   the	   questions	   of	  when	   and	   in	   what	   conditions	   that	   right	   to	   force	   might	   be	   enacted,	   what	  constraints	   it	   should	  be	  subject	   to,	  and	  what	  kind	  of	  post-­‐war	  obligations	  yield	  from	  its	  successful	  conclusion,	  little	  thought	  has	  been	  given	  to	  what	  qualifies	  as	  victory	   in	   contemporary	   warfare.	   	   Yet	   it	   is	   arguably	   the	   latter	   question	   that	  demands	  most	  attention	  in	  the	  warzones	  of	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq,	  Libya,	  and	  Gaza.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Michael	  Cohen,	  ‘Is	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  Conflict	  going	  to	  be	  the	  war	  that	  never	  ends?’,	  The	  Guardian,	  3	  August	  2014.	  	  Available	  at:	  http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/03/arab-­‐israel-­‐palestinians-­‐gaza-­‐conflict-­‐may-­‐never-­‐end.	  	  Accessed	  on:	  30	  August	  2014.	  	  Amira	  Hass,	  ‘Israel’s	  moral	  defeat	  will	  haunt	  us	  for	  years’,	  Haaretz,	  28	  July	  2014.	  	  Available	  at:	  http://www.haaretz.com/mobile/.premium-­‐1.607550?v=B844E2B9134251232410386CC5A070D8.	  	  Accessed	  on:	  30	  August	  2014.	  	  Ian	  Black,	  ‘Palestinian	  groups	  see	  captures	  as	  a	  strategic	  weapon	  to	  help	  redress	  military	  imbalances,	  but	  latest	  is	  likely	  to	  prolong	  fighting’,	  The	  Guardian,	  1	  August	  2014.	  	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/01/israeli-officer-capture-
gaza-hamas.  Accessed on: 2 August 2014.	  6	  Benjamin	  R.	  Banta,	  ‘“Virtuous	  War”	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum’,	  
Review	  of	  International	  Studies,	  37:1	  (2011),	  pp.	  277-­‐299.	  	  Also:	  Eric	  D.	  Patterson,	  
Ending	  Wars	  Well:	  Order,	  Justice,	  and	  Conciliation	  in	  Contemporary	  Post-­‐Conflict	  (New	  Haven,	  CT.:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2012).	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   Motivated	  by	  these	  concerns,	  this	  article	  examines	  what	  victory	  means	  in	  relation	   to	   just	   war.	   	   It	   proceeds	   via	   four	   steps.	   	   The	   first	   section	   asks	   what	  victory	   means	   in	   the	   context	   of	   contemporary	   warfare.	   	   It	   contends	   that	   the	  notion	  of	  victory	  is	  not	  only	  tricky	  to	  define,	  it	  is	  also,	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  cast	  exclusively	   in	   strategic	   terms	   that	   encourage	   us	   to	   overlook	   its	   normative	  dimension.	  	  Seeking	  to	  remedy	  this	  oversight,	  Section	  Two	  investigates	  how,	  if	  at	  all,	  victory	  has	   featured	   in	   the	  mainline	  of	  classical	  and	  contemporary	   just	  war	  thinking.	  	  It	  argues	  that	  victory	  has	  long	  been	  regarded	  as	  peripheral	  to	  this	  body	  of	   thought.	   	   Developing	   this	   argument,	   but	   adopting	   a	   tighter	   focus,	   Section	  Three	   examines	   how	  victory	   is	   posited	   in	   one	   very	   specific	   branch	   of	   just	  war	  inquiry,	  the	  jus	  post	  bellum	  pole	  of	  analysis	  dedicated	  to	  interrogating	  questions	  of	  justice	  after	  war.	  	  It	  submits	  that	  although	  victory	  is	  frequently	  invoked	  by	  jus	  
post	  bellum	  scholars,	   it	   is	   in	  actual	   fact	  marginal	   to	   their	  primary	  concerns.	   	   In	  practice,	   jus	  post	  bellum	  scholars	   tend	   to	  be	  more	   interested	   in	   the	  question	  of	  how	   justice	   may	   be	   enacted	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   war	   than	   in	   teasing	   out	   the	  meaning	  and	  moral	  significance	  of	  victory	   itself.	   	  Building	  on	   this,	  Section	  Four	  asks	  whether	  it	  is	  time	  for	  just	  war	  scholars	  to	  develop	  an	  account	  of	  victory.	  	  As	  well	   as	   making	   a	   case	   for	   why	   scholars	   should	   consider	   such	   a	   project,	   it	  previews	  the	  difficulties	  that	  would	  surely	  attend	  it.	  	  By	  way	  of	  closing	  remarks,	  the	  article	  reflects	  in	  general	  terms	  on	  the	  challenge	  that	  thinking	  about	  victory	  in	  modern	  warfare	  poses	   for	   just	  war	   scholars.	   	   It	   submits	   that	   the	   concept	   of	  victory	   has	   an	   aporetic	   quality	   insofar	   as	   it	   appears	   both	   essential	   to	   but	   also	  potentially	  incompatible	  with	  the	  just	  war	  ethos.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  article	  concludes,	  it	  reveals	  both	  the	  limits	  and	  possibilities	  of	  just	  war	  thinking.	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What	  is	  Victory?	  The	  concept	  of	  victory	  has	  attracted	  a	  healthy	  amount	  of	  scholarly	  attention	   in	  recent	  years.	  	  Monographs	  by	  Brian	  Bond,	  William	  C.	  Martel,	  Robert	  Mandel,	  and	  Dominic	   Tierney	   and	  Dominic	   Johnson,	   among	   others,	   have	   established	   it	   as	   a	  key	  topic	  of	   inquiry	   for	  military	  strategists	  and	  historians	   in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era.7	  	  Despite	  this,	  victory	  remains	  a	  difficult	  concept	  to	  pin	  down.	  	  When	  seeking	  to	  define	  it,	  we	  confront	  the	  same	  problems	  Saint	  Augustine	  encountered	  when	  he	   attempted	   to	   explain	   the	   nature	   of	   time:	   ‘Provided	   that	   no	   one	   asks	   me,	   I	  know.	  	  If	  I	  want	  to	  explain	  it	  to	  an	  inquirer,	  I	  do	  not	  know’.8	  	  Some	  scholars,	  most	  notably	   Martel,	   have	   responded	   to	   this	   challenge	   by	   elucidating	   elaborate	  typologies	   that	   account	   for	   different	   levels	   of	   victory.9	   	   Others,	   conceding	   that	  victory	   is	   an	   inherently	   nebulous	   concept,	   have	   preferred	   to	   operate	   Justice	  Potter’s	   rule:	   like	   pornography,	   we	   are	   simply	   expected	   to	   recognize	   victory	  when	   we	   see	   it.10	   	   The	   only	   common	   point	   of	   reference	   in	   this	   literature	   is	  Clausewitz’s	   influential	   but	   rather	   gnomic	   account	   of	   victory	   as	   the	   successful	  imposition	  of	  one’s	  will	  upon	  the	  enemy.11	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Brian	  Bond,	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Victory:	  From	  Napoleon	  to	  Saddam	  Hussein	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996).	  	  William	  C.	  Martel,	  Victory	  in	  War:	  Foundations	  of	  
Modern	  Strategy—Revised	  and	  Expanded	  Ed.	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  	  Robert	  Mandel,	  The	  Meaning	  of	  Military	  Victory	  (Boulder:	  Lynne	  Rienner,	  2006).	  	  Dominic	  Johnson	  and	  Dominic	  Tierney,	  Failing	  to	  Win:	  
Perceptions	  of	  Victory	  and	  Defeat	  in	  International	  Politics	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2006).	  8	  Saint	  Augustine,	  Confessions,	  trans.	  by	  Henry	  Chadwick	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  p.	  230.	  9	  Martel,	  Victory	  in	  War,	  pp.	  17-­‐56.	  10	  Dominic	  P.	  Johnson	  and	  Dominic	  Tierney,	  ‘In	  the	  Eye	  of	  the	  Beholder:	  Victory	  and	  Defeat	  in	  US	  Military	  Operations’,	  in	  Jan	  Angstrom	  and	  Isabelle	  Duyvesteyn	  (eds.),	  Understanding	  Defeat	  and	  Victory	  in	  Contemporary	  War	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  p.	  46.	  	  Also:	  Mandel,	  The	  Meaning	  of	  Military	  Victory,	  p.	  3.	  11	  Carl	  von	  Clausewitz,	  On	  War,	  trans.	  by	  Michael	  Howard	  and	  Peter	  Paret,	  ed.	  by	  Beatrice	  Heuser	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  p.	  13.	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   Efforts	   to	   apply	   Clausewitz	   and	   specify	   what	   victory	   might	   mean	   in	  respect	  of	  modern	  war	  are	  beset	  by	  several	  difficulties	  that	  bear	  primarily	  upon	  its	  association	   in	   the	  modern	   imaginary	  with	   ideas	  of	   totality	  and	  decisiveness.	  	  Owing	   to	   the	   preoccupation	   with	   pitched	   combat	   in	   military	   historiography,	  victory	  has	  come	  to	  be	  closely	  tied	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  decisive	  battles,	  battles	  that	  produce	  an	  emphatic	  winner	  and	  settle	  the	  disputes	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  them.12	  	  Thanks	  largely	  to	  the	  writings	  of	  Sir	  Edward	  Creasy	  and	  J.	  F.	  C.	  Fuller,	  triumphs	  like	  those	  won	  by	  Napoleon	  at	  Austerlitz	  and	  the	  British	  at	  Waterloo—contests	  that	  ended	  in	  the	  flight	  of	  the	  enemy	  and	  set	  the	  course	  of	  history	  for	  generations	  to	  come—came	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  archetypes	  of	  victory.13	   	  Warfare,	  however,	  has	  only	  very	  rarely	  turned	  on	  climactic	  battles:	  historically	  speaking,	  they	  have	  been	  the	  exception	  rather	  the	  rule.14	   	  The	  point	   is	   that	  victory,	  as	   it	   is	   typically	  understood,	   is	   freighted	   with	   associations	   to	   totality	   and	   decisiveness	   that	  diminish	   its	   applicability	   to	   modern	   war	   even	   as	   they	   enhance	   its	   rhetorical	  power.	   	   As	   ‘old	   wars’	   have	   been	   supplanted	   by	   ‘new	   wars’,	   it	   has	   become	  increasingly	   clear	   that	   that	   received	   understandings	   of	   victory	   carry	   historical	  baggage	  that	  reduce	  its	  relevance	  today.15	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Lawrence	  Freedman,	  Strategy:	  A	  History	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  p.	  49,	  71.	  13	  Sir	  Edward	  Creasy,	  The	  Fifteen	  Decisive	  Battles	  of	  the	  World:	  From	  Marathon	  to	  
Waterloo	  (London:	  Richard	  Bentley,	  1851).	  	  J.	  F.	  C.	  Fuller,	  The	  Decisive	  Battles	  of	  
the	  Western	  World	  and	  their	  Influence	  Upon	  History—Three	  Volumes	  (London:	  Eyre	  and	  Spottiswoode,	  1954-­‐6).	  14	  Russell	  Weigley	  argues	  that	  they	  were	  a	  possibility	  for	  the	  brief	  spell	  between	  the	  battles	  of	  Breitenfeld	  (1631)	  and	  Waterloo	  (1815),	  but	  not	  beyond	  this.	  	  Russell	  Weigley,	  The	  Age	  of	  Battles:	  The	  Quest	  for	  Decisive	  Warfare	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press),	  xi.	  	  	  15	  President	  Obama	  confessess	  he	  was	  ‘always	  worried	  about	  using	  the	  word	  “victory”,	  because,	  you	  know,	  it	  invokes	  this	  notion	  of	  Emperor	  Hirohito	  coming	  down	  and	  signing	  a	  surrender	  to	  MacArthur’.	  	  Gabriella	  Blum,	  ‘The	  Fog	  of	  Victory’,	  The	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  24:1	  (2013),	  p.	  421.	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In	   contrast	   to	   the	   archetypal	   decisive	   battles	   described	   by	   Creasy	   and	  Fuller,	  and	  often	  associated	  with	  Napoleonic	  campaigning	  and,	  more	  broadly,	  the	  so-­‐called	   ‘western	   way	   of	   war’,	   modern	   warfare	   does	   not	   typically	   produce	   a	  clear-­‐cut	   victory.16	   	  Rather,	   it	   tends	   to	  degenerate	   into	   stalemate,	   quagmire,	   or	  the	   protracted	   grind	   of	   low-­‐intensity	   conflict.	   	   In	   such	   cases,	   references	   to	  victory,	  at	  least	  as	  it	  is	  typically	  understood,	  bear	  little	  relation	  to	  events	  on	  the	  ground	   and	   should	   be	   dismissed	   as	   misleading	   and	   unhelpful.17	   	   As	   Mandel	  observes,	   the	   historical	   record	   indicates	   that	   there	   has	   been	   ‘an	   observable	  decline	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  wars	  in	  which	  there	  was	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  winner	  or	  loser’.	  	  Wars,	  he	  continues,	  do	  not	  end	  the	  way	  that	  they	  used	  to:	  fewer	  wars	  than	  before	  terminate	  in	  a	   ‘clean,	  decisive	  victory	  for	  one	  side	  or	  the	  other’.	   	  He	  infers	  from	  this	  that	  ‘as	  outcomes	  go,	  victory	  and	  defeat	  may	  be	  going	  the	  way	  of	  slavery	  and	  duelling’.18	  	  Although	  Mandel	  overstates	  the	  case,	  his	  key	  point	  is	  hard	  to	  rebut.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  On	  the	  western	  way	  of	  war:	  Victor	  Davis	  Hanson,	  The	  Western	  Way	  of	  Warfare:	  
Infantry	  Battle	  in	  Classical	  Greece	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2009).	  	  For	  a	  critique:	  Harry	  Sidebottom,	  Ancient	  Warfare:	  A	  Very	  Short	  Introduction	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  pp.	  1-­‐4.	  	  17	  This	  point	  of	  view	  has	  undoubtedly	  informed	  the	  sceptical	  response	  to	  President	  George	  W,	  Bush’s	  infamous	  ‘Mission	  accomplished’	  speech	  aboard	  the	  flight	  deck	  of	  the	  USS	  Abraham	  Lincoln.	  	  As	  Larry	  Diamond	  remarks,	  this	  speech	  has	  come	  to	  be	  mocked	  for	  its	  ironic	  quality.	  	  Yet,	  perhaps	  illustrative	  of	  the	  enduring	  appeal	  of	  ‘victory-­‐talk’,	  Prime	  Minister	  David	  Cameron	  repeated	  the	  formula	  in	  a	  recent	  2013	  speech	  on	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan.	  	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush,	  ‘President	  Announces	  Major	  Combat	  Operations	  in	  Iraq	  Have	  Ended,	  1st	  May,	  2003’.	  	  Available	  at:	  http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/05/01/bush.transcript/.	  Accessed	  on:	  2	  May,	  2014.	  	  Larry	  Diamond,	  Squandered	  Victory:	  The	  American	  Occupation	  and	  the	  
Bungled	  Effort	  to	  Bring	  Democracy	  to	  Iraq	  (Owl	  Books:	  New	  York,	  2006).	  	  Rowena	  Mason,	  ‘Mission	  Accomplished	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Declares	  David	  Cameron’,	  
Guardian,	  16	  December	  2013.	  	  Accessed	  on:	  3	  April	  2014.	  	  Available	  at:	  http://www.theguardian.com/uk-­‐news/2013/dec/16/afghanistan-­‐mission-­‐accomplished-­‐david-­‐cameron.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Robert	  Mandel,	  ‘Defining	  Postwar	  Victory’,	  in	  Jan	  Angstrom	  and	  Isabelle	  Duyvesteyn	  (eds.),	  Understanding	  Victory	  and	  Defeat	  in	  Contemporary	  War	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  p.	  18.	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   Moreover,	  even	  if	  we	  refute	  the	  observation	  that	  modern	  war	  rarely	  gives	  rise	  to	  decisive	  victories,	  we	  are	  still	  left	  with	  the	  difficulty	  of	  determining	  how	  to	  identify	  victory	  in	  practice.	  	  According	  to	  the	  standard	  view,	  victory	  requires	  the	  infliction	  of	  a	   sufficient	   level	  of	  damage	  upon	   the	  enemy’s	  material	   capabilities	  and	  morale	   to	  compel	   its	  admission	  of	  defeat.	   	  There	  are,	  however,	  no	  obvious	  criteria	  by	  which	  to	  gauge	  the	  accomplishment	  of	  these	  ends.	  	  While	  command	  of	  the	   battlefield	   is	   the	   classic	   yardstick,	   it	   is	   of	   little	   help	   in	   an	   era	   defined	   by	  extended	   campaigns	   and	   amorphous	   battlespaces.	   	   In	   its	   place,	   commentators	  have	   measured	   military	   victories	   on	   the	   basis,	   variously,	   of	   body-­‐counts,	   the	  annexation	  of	   territory,	   the	   capture	   of	   capital	   cities,	   the	  winning	   of	   hearts	   and	  minds,	   and	   the	   accomplishment	   of	   predetermined	  war	   objectives.	   	   There	   is	   no	  obvious	   way	   to	   harmonize	   these	   rival	   metrics	   when	   they	   produce	   different	  answers	   to	   the	   question	   of	   who	   won	   a	   particular	   war.19	   	   This	   problem	   is	  magnified	  when	  we	   view	   it	   in	   light	   of	   the	  war	   on	   terror.	   	   As	   the	   Secretary	   of	  Defence,	  Donald	  Rumsfeld,	  complained	  in	  2003,	  ‘we	  lack	  a	  metrics	  to	  know	  if	  we	  are	  winning	  or	  losing	  the	  global	  war	  on	  terror’.20	  	  Four	  years	  later,	  General	  David	  Petraeus	  echoed	  Rumsfeld’s	  consternation.	  	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  know	  if	  you	  are	  winning	  the	  fight	  against	  Al	  Qaeda,	  he	  remarked,	  because	  ‘This	  is	  not	  the	  sort	  of	  struggle	  where	  you	  take	  a	  hill,	  plant	  the	  flag	  and	  go	  home	  with	  a	  victory	  parade.’21	   	  The	  problem	  with	   victory	   is,	   then,	   also	   an	   epistemic	   one:	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   recognize	   it	  when	  it	  occurs,	  or	  to	  establish	  markers	  for	  it.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Johnson	  and	  Tierney,	  Failing	  to	  Win.	  20	  Quoted	  in:	  Mandel,	  The	  Meaning	  of	  Military	  Victory,	  p.	  135.	  	  21	  Mark	  Tran,	  ‘General	  David	  Petraeus	  Warns	  of	  Long	  Struggle	  Ahead	  for	  US	  in	  Iraq’,	  Guardian,	  11	  September	  2008.	  	  Available	  at:	  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/sep/11/iraq.usa.	  	  Accessed:	  31	  January	  2014.	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   One	  of	  the	  lessons	  to	  arise	  from	  the	  strife	  of	  the	  past	  decade	  is	  that	  these	  issues	   are	   ignored	   only	   at	   great	   peril	   and	   cost.22	   	   The	   root	   of	   these	   issues,	  however,	   is,	   not	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	   Clausewitzian	   account	   of	   victory	   to	  modern	  war,	  but	  the	  Clausewitzian	  account	  of	  victory	  itself.	  	  By	  reducing	  victory	  to	   the	   imposition	   of	   one’s	   will	   upon	   the	   enemy,	   the	   Clausewitzian	   account	   of	  victory	  overlooks	  and	  indeed	  obscures	  a	  central	  article	  of	  earlier	  writings	  about	  victory,	   namely	   that	   victory	   is	   closely	   bound	   with	   deeper	   considerations	   of	  justice,	  peace,	  and	  order.23	  	  It	  thus	  seduces	  scholars	  and	  military	  planners	  to	  set	  aside	  the	  normative	  dimensions	  of	  victory	  and	  approach	  it	  as	  a	  purely	  strategic	  issue.	   	   According	   to	  Beatrice	  Heuser,	   this	   has	   had	   a	   profoundly	   negative	   effect	  upon	  how	  we	  think	  about	  winning	  wars.	   	  Not	  only	  has	   it	  disconnected	  modern	  strategic	  thought	  from	  classical	  and	  medieval	  thinking	  about	  victory,	  it	  has	  also	  divorced	   the	   pursuit	   of	   military	   victory	   from	   the	   values—peace,	   order,	   and	  justice—that	   it	   ought	   to	   serve.24	   	   Heuser	   proposes	   that	   a	   possible	   solution	   to	  these	  problems	  is	  to	  look	  beyond	  Clausewitz,	  to	  deeper	  traditions	  of	  military	  and	  political	   thought,	   in	   order	   to	   recover	   more	   constructive	   understandings	   of	  victory.	   	  Rising	  to	   this	  challenge,	   the	  remainder	  of	   this	  article	  examines	  what	   if	  any	  conception	  of	  military	  victory	  can	  be	  found	  within	  the	  just	  war	  tradition.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Gideon	  Rose,	  How	  Wars	  End:	  Why	  We	  Always	  Fight	  the	  Last	  Battle	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  &	  Schuster,	  2011),	  xi-­‐xiv.	  23	  Military	  writings	  since	  Clausewitz	  have	  been	  ‘dominated	  by	  the	  pursuit	  of	  victory	  for	  its	  own	  sake,	  victory	  divorced	  from	  the	  political	  settlement	  of	  a	  fundamentally	  political	  conflict,	  victory	  not	  as	  a	  reward	  for	  just	  cause	  or	  piety	  but	  due	  only	  to	  strength	  or	  at	  best	  cunning	  and	  underpinned	  by	  the	  Social	  Darwinist	  notion	  that	  the	  fitter	  nation	  deserved	  to	  prevail’.	  	  Beatrice	  Heuser,	  ‘Victory,	  Peace,	  and	  Justice:	  The	  Neglected	  Trinity’,	  Joint	  Forces	  Quarterly	  69	  (2013),	  p.	  7.	  	  	  24	  Beatrice	  Heuser,	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Strategy:	  Thinking	  War	  from	  Antiquity	  to	  the	  
Present	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  pp.	  10-­‐2,	  140-­‐2,	  472.	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Victory	  in	  Contemporary	  and	  Classical	  Just	  War	  Thought	  The	  just	  war	  tradition	  is	  arguably	  predominantly	  the	  predominant	  western	  body	  of	  thought	  concerning	  the	  ethics	  of	  armed	  conflict.	  	  Boasting	  a	  lineage	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  sunset	  of	  the	  Roman	  Empire,	  it	  reflects	  two	  millennia	  of	  reflection	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  war.	   	  A	  conundrum	  lies	  at	   its	  very	  core:	  Can	  the	  use	  of	  military	  force	  ever	  be	  an	  instrument	  of	  justice?	  	  Though	  scholars	  often	  quibble	  about	  its	  exact	  composition,	  a	  consensus	  has	  emerged	  that	  the	  just	  war	  tradition	  hinges	  on	  three	   distinct	   but	   connected	   questions.	   	   The	   first	   question,	   which	   stands	   for	  the	  jus	   ad	   bellum	  pole	   of	   just	   war	   reasoning,	   asks	   whether	   and	   under	   what	  conditions	   the	   recourse	   to	   war	  might	   ever	   be	   justified.	   	   The	   second	   question,	  reflecting	   the	  jus	   in	   bello	  dimension	   of	   analysis,	   asks	   how	   a	   war,	   once	   begun,	  might	   be	   waged	   in	   a	   just	   manner.	   	   The	   third	   and	   final	   question,	   the	  jus	   post	  
bellum	  challenge,	  invites	  reflection	  on	  how	  wars	  should	  be	  concluded	  and	  a	  just	  peace	   cultivated.	   	   The	  jus	   ad	   bellum	  turns	   on	   five	   key	   precepts,	   ‘just	   cause’,	  ‘proper	   authority’,	   ‘right	   intention’,	   ‘reasonable	   chance	   of	   success’,	   and	   ‘last	  resort’.	   	   The	  jus	   in	   bello	  pivots	   on	   the	   requirements	   of	   ‘discrimination’	   and	  proportionality’.	  	  The	  jus	  post	  bellum	  reflects	  a	  vague	  set	  of	  desiderata	  bearing	  on	  reconciliation,	  reconstruction,	  and	  rehabilitation.	  	   One	   struggles	   to	   find	   references	   to	   victory	   in	   contemporary	   just	   war	  literature.	   	   The	   closest	   one	   gets	   to	   it	   is	   the	   listing	   of	   ‘reasonable	   chance	   of	  success’	   as	  a	   jus	  ad	  bellum	  principle.	   	  This	  principle	   stipulates	   that,	   in	  order	   to	  have	  just	  recourse	  to	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  a	  community	  must	  boast	  good	  prospects	  of	  prevailing	   in	   the	   ensuing	   conflict.	   	   This	   precludes	   the	   pursuit	   of	   lost	   causes.	  	  James	   Turner	   Johnson	   submits	   that	   this	   principle	   operates	   to	   introduce	   a	  prudential	  element	  into	  deliberations	  regarding	  the	  resort	  to	  war,	  and,	  as	  such,	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should	  be	  categorized	  an	  ancillary	  element	  of	  the	   jus	  ad	  bellum.25	   	  Even	  so,	   it	   is	  not	   exactly	   clear	   what	   it	   requires.	   	   As	   Amy	   Eckert	   observes,	   ‘The	   reasonable	  chance	  of	  success	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  what	  success	  really	  means’	  in	  respect	  to	  war.26	  Whatever	   about	   ‘reasonable	   chance	   of	   success’,	   the	   concept	   of	   victory	  itself	   does	   not	   appear	   in	   many	   tables	   of	   contents,	   and	   receives	   mere	   passing	  reference	  in	  recent	  key	  texts	  in	  the	  field.27	  	  Even	  Michael	  Walzer’s	  classic	  Just	  and	  
Unjust	  Wars	  only	  briefly	  skims	  it.	  	  Walzer’s	  engagement	  with	  victory	  takes	  place	  in	   the	   context	   of	   two	   chapters	   devoted	   respectively	   to	   ‘winning’	   wars.28	   	   He	  evokes	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  victory	  by	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  quoting	  a	  verse	  from	  Randall	  Jarrell	  on	  the	  illusory	  character	  of	  victory	  in	  war,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  proclaiming	  its	  centrality	  to	  the	  very	  idea	  of	   just	  war.	   	  The	  latter	  point	   is	  worth	  developing.	  	  Walzer	  states	  that	  victory	   is	  essential	   to	  the	   idea	  of	   just	  war	   insofar	  as	   it	   is	   the	  promise	  of	  the	  former	  that	  justifies	  the	  sacrifices	  required	  by	  the	  latter.	   	   ‘There	  must	   be’,	   he	   writes,	   ‘purposes	   that	   are	   worth	   dying	   for,	   outcomes	   for	   which	  soldiers’	  lives	  are	  not	  too	  high	  a	  price.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  just	  war	  requires	  the	  same	  assumption.	   	  A	   just	  war	   is	  one	  that	   is	  morally	  urgent	  to	  win,	  and	  a	  soldier	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  James	  Turner	  Johnson,	  The	  War	  to	  Oust	  Saddam	  Hussein:	  Just	  War	  and	  the	  New	  
Face	  of	  Conflict	  (Lanham:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield,	  2005),	  p.	  37.	  	  Also	  see:	  Alex	  J.	  Bellamy,	  Just	  Wars:	  From	  Cicero	  to	  Iraq	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2006),	  p.	  123.	  26	  Amy	  E.	  Eckert,	  ‘Private	  Military	  Companies	  and	  the	  Reasonable	  Chance	  of	  Success’,	  in	  Caron	  E.	  Gentry	  and	  Amy	  E.	  Eckert	  (eds.),	  The	  Future	  of	  Just	  War:	  New	  
Critical	  Essays	  (Athens,	  GA:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  2014),	  p.64.	  27	  For	  example:	  Nigel	  Biggar,	  In	  Defence	  of	  War	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  	  Nicholas	  Rengger,	  Just	  War	  and	  International	  Order	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  	  David	  Fisher,	  Morality	  and	  War:	  Can	  War	  be	  
Just	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century?	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  28	  Michael	  Walzer,	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars:	  A	  Moral	  Argument	  with	  Historical	  
Illustrations—2nd	  edition	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1992),	  Chapters	  7	  and	  14.	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dies	  in	  a	  just	  war	  does	  not	  die	  in	  vain’.29	  	  Nevertheless,	  he	  admits	  that	  even	  if	  we	  know	  that	  ‘it	  is	  sometimes	  urgent	  to	  win,	  it	  is	  not	  always	  clear	  what	  winning	  is’.	  	  Beyond	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  Allied	  policy	  of	  unconditional	  surrender	  in	  World	  War	  II,	   and	   his	   insistence	   that	   the	   ‘legitimate	   ends	   of	   war’	   also	   furnish	   its	   proper	  limits,	   beyond	   which	   any	   further	   fighting	   must	   be	   deemed	   criminal,	   Walzer’s	  own	  analysis	  does	  little	  to	  address	  this	  problem.30	  	  This	  problem	  is	  amplified	  in	  his	  recent	  writings	  on	  jus	  post	  bellum,	  which	  we	  will	  discuss	  in	  Section	  Three.	  	   What	  about	  the	  classical	  just	  war	  tradition?	  	  The	  concept	  of	  victory	  does	  feature	   relatively	   prominently	   in	   many	   of	   the	   landmark	   texts	   of	   the	   just	   war	  tradition.	   	   It	   is	  pivotal	   to	   Isidore	  of	  Seville’s	  account	  of	   just	  war,	  worked	  out	   in	  Book	  XVIII	  of	  the	  Etymologies.31	  	  Francisco	  de	  Vitoria	  devotes	  the	  third	  canon	  of	  warfare	   to	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   the	   victor	   in	   battle.	   	   ‘Once	   the	  war	   has	   been	  fought	  and	  victory	  won,	  he	  must	  use	  his	  victory	  with	  moderation	  and	  Christian	  humility’.	   	  The	  victor,	  he	  continues,	  must	  think	  of	  himself	  not	  as	  the	  prosecutor	  but	  as	  a	  ‘judge	  sitting	  in	  judgment	  between	  two	  commonwealths,	  one	  the	  injured	  party	  and	  the	  other	   the	  offender’.32	   	  Francisco	  Suarez	  also	   treated	  victory	  as	  of	  paramount	  importance.	  	  He	  contends	  not	  only	  that	  a	  prince	  must	  demonstrate	  a	  reasonable	  chance	  of	  achieving	  victory	  before	  committing	  troops	  to	  war,	  but	  also	  that	  the	  stages	  of	  war	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  respect	  of	  their	  relation	  to	  victory.	  	  ‘Three	  periods’,	  he	  writes,	  ‘must	  be	  distinguished	  [with	  respect	  to	  every	  war]:	  its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Walzer,	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars,	  p.	  110.	  30	  Walzer,	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars,	  p.	  110.	  31	  Isidore	  draws	  heavily	  on	  Roman	  conceptions	  of	  victory	  and	  the	  relation	  of	  this	  concept	  to	  the	  distinction	  drawn	  between	  bellum	  and	  duellum.	  	  The	  Etymologies	  
of	  Isidore	  of	  Seville,	  trans.	  by	  Stephen	  A.	  Barney	  et	  al	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  pp.	  359-­‐73.	  	  32	  Francisco	  de	  Vitoria’,	  ‘On	  the	  Laws	  of	  War’,	  in	  Anthony	  Pagden	  and	  Jeremy	  Lawrance	  (eds.),	  Vitoria:	  Political	  Writings	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  p.	  327	  [§60].	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inception;	   its	   prosecution,	   before	   victory	   is	   gained;	   and	   the	   period	   after	  victory’.33	   	   Later,	   in	   the	   17th	   and	   18th	   century,	   respectively,	   Hugo	   Grotius	   and	  Emerich	  de	  Vattel	  devoted	  several	  chapters	  to	  detailing	  the	  rights	  that	  victory	  in	  battle	  conferred	  upon	  the	  winner	  over	  the	  loser.34	  	  	  Should	  one	  wish	  to	  dig	  deeper,	  beyond	  what	  is	  conventionally	  recognized	  as	   the	   mainline	   of	   the	   tradition,	   one	   will	   also	   uncover	   meditations	   upon	   the	  relation	   between	   just	   war	   and	   victory	   in	   ancient	   Greek	   and	   Roman	   political	  thought.	   	   Writings	   about	   Greco-­‐Roman	   military	   practice	   are	   replete	   with	  references	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  only	  victories	  attained	  by	  honourable	  means—that	  is,	  through	   pitched	   battles	   and	   without	   recourse	   to	   trickery	   or	   guile—in	   wars	  formally	   authorized	   by	   the	   gods	   could	   be	   leveraged	   as	   a	   source	   of	   glory	   for	  states.	  	  By	  contrast,	  victories	  won	  by	  dubious	  means	  were	  wont	  to	  be	  derided	  as	  a	  source	  of	  shame.35	  	  Little	  work	  has,	  however,	  been	  done	  on	  the	  role	  played	  by	  victory	  in	  early	  just	  war	  thinking.	  	  It	  has	  been	  almost	  entirely	  ignored.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Francisco	  Suarez,	  ‘A	  Work	  on	  the	  Three	  Theological	  Virtues:	  On	  Charity’	  in	  Gwladys.	  L.	  Williams,	  Ammi	  Brown,	  and	  John	  Waldron	  (eds.)	  Selections	  From	  
Three	  Works	  of	  Francisco	  Suarez	  (Carnegie	  Classics	  of	  International	  Law:	  New	  York,	  1944),	  p.	  882-­‐3,	  836	  [XIII.IV.10,	  XIII.VII.1].	  34	  Hugo	  Grotius,	  The	  Rights	  of	  War	  and	  Peace,	  trans.	  by	  Richard	  Tuck	  (Indianapolis:	  Liberty	  Fund,	  2005),	  Book	  III	  Chapters	  VIII	  and	  XV.	  	  Emer	  de	  Vattel,	  The	  Law	  of	  Nations,	  ed.	  by	  Bela	  Kapossy	  and	  Richard	  Whatmore	  (Indianapolis:	  Liberty	  Fund,	  2008),	  p.	  598	  [III.XIII.	  §201].	  35	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  Queen	  of	  Massagitae’s	  condemnation	  of	  Cyrus’s	  guile	  in	  war,	  and	  the	  controversy	  surrounding	  the	  Athenians’	  use	  of	  aerial	  bombardment	  to	  capture	  the	  Spartan	  troops	  stranded	  on	  Sphacteria	  in	  425	  BCE.	  	  In	  the	  Roman	  context,	  Cicero	  posited	  a	  relation	  between	  the	  quality	  of	  victory	  and	  the	  means	  used	  to	  secure	  it.	  	  Herodotus,	  The	  Histories,	  trans.	  by	  Robin	  Waterfield	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  p.	  93.	  	  Thucydides,	  The	  War	  of	  the	  Peloponnesians	  
and	  the	  Athenians,	  ed.	  by	  Jeremy	  Myntott	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  p.	  254-­‐9.	  	  Cicero,	  On	  Duties,	  ed.	  by	  M.	  T.	  Griffin	  and	  E.	  M.	  Atkins	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  p.	  72-­‐3.	  	  See:	  Cian	  O’Driscoll,	  ‘Re-­‐Writing	  the	  Just	  War	  Tradition:	  Just	  War	  in	  Ancient	  Greek	  Political	  Thought	  and	  Practice’,	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly	  (Forthcoming	  2015).	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The	  Victory	  of	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum	  There	   is,	   however,	   one	   area	   of	   just	   war	   scholarship	   where	   victory	   at	   least	  appears	   to	   enjoy	   the	   limelight.	   	   This	   is	   the	   jus	   post	   bellum	   pole	   of	   just	   war	  analysis,	  dedicated	  to	  examining	  questions	  of	  post-­‐war	  justice.	  	  Understood	  as	  a	  discreet	   area	   of	   investigation,	   the	   idea	   of	   jus	   post	   bellum	   is	   itself	   a	   recent	  development.36	   	   It	   may	   be	   traced	   to	   the	   early	   1990s,	   to	   Michael	   J.	   Schuck’s	  influential	  1994	  essay	  in	  the	  Christian	  Century.37	   	  Appalled	  by	  the	  triumphalism	  displayed	  by	   the	  US	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  1991	  Gulf	  War,	   Schuck	  argued	   that	   the	  victory	   parade	   conducted	   by	   veterans	   of	   the	   war,	   including	   General	   Norman	  Schwarzkopf,	  showed	  a	  lack	  of	  both	  humility	  and	  remorse	  for	  the	  losses	  that	  the	  war	   had	   occasioned	   on	   both	   sides.	   	   More	   deeply,	   he	   claimed,	   it	   exposed	   the	  general	  lack	  of	  thought	  devoted	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  states	  ought	  to	  comport	  themselves	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  war.	   	  As	  a	  remedy,	  Schuck	  coined	  the	  phrase	   jus	  
post	  bellum	  and	  proffered	  it	  as	  the	  missing	  element	  of	  just	  war	  theory.	  	  Latterly,	  Brian	   Orend,	   Gary	   Bass,	   and	   Alex	   J.	   Bellamy	   among	   others,	   have	   endorsed	  Schuck’s	   case	   for	   jus	   post	   bellum	  and	  argued	   that	   rather	   than	   concentrating	   all	  their	  efforts	  on	  the	  initial	  decision	  to	  resort	  to	  war	  and	  its	  subsequent	  conduct,	  contemporary	   just	   war	   theorists	   should	   devote	   more	   time	   and	   energy	   to	  contemplating	  the	  ethical	  challenges	  that	  arise	  at	  war’s	  end.38	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  I	  am	  not	  claiming	  that	  the	  jus	  post	  bellum	  is	  disconnected	  from	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  and	  jus	  in	  bello	  concerns;	  all	  three	  elements	  of	  just	  war	  reasoning	  clearly	  crosscut	  one	  another.	  	  I	  merely	  note	  that	  the	  jus	  post	  bellum	  has	  only	  recently	  been	  posited	  as	  a	  distinct	  category	  of	  analysis,	  worthy	  of	  its	  own	  Latinate	  name.	  37	  Michael	  J.	  Schuck,	  ‘When	  the	  Shooting	  Stops:	  Missing	  Elements	  in	  Just	  War	  Theory’,	  Christian	  Century	  (26	  October	  1994):	  982-­‐3.	  38	  Brian	  Orend,	  ‘Jus	  Post	  Bellum’,	  Journal	  of	  Social	  Philosophy	  31:1	  (2000):	  117-­‐137.	  	  Gary	  Bass,	  ‘Jus	  Post	  Bellum’,	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs	  32:4	  (2004):	  384-­‐412.	  	  Alex	  J.	  Bellamy,	  ‘The	  Responsibilities	  of	  Victory:	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum	  and	  the	  Just	  War’,	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies	  34	  (2008):	  601-­‐625.	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   The	  concept	  of	  victory	  is	  ubiquitous	  within	  the	  jus	  post	  bellum.	  	  A	  number	  of	   influential	   scholars,	   including	  Louis	   Iasiello,	  Bellamy,	  Larry	  May,	  and	  Darren	  Mollendorf,	   have	   posited	   it	   as	   the	   pivot	   of	   jus	   post	   bellum	   analysis.	   	   Iasiello	  equates	   the	   remit	   of	   jus	   post	   bellum	   with	   the	   task	   of	   determining	   the	  responsibilities	  that	  victors	   in	  war	   incur	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  societies	  that	  have	  fallen	  under	  their	  sway.	   	  He	  writes	  that	  the	  job	  of	   jus	  post	  bellum	  theorists	  is	  to	  devise	   ‘moral	  precepts	   to	  guide	   the	  post	  bellum	  activities	  of	  victors’.39	   	  Bellamy	  proposes	   that	   the	   principal	   division	   in	   the	   jus	   post	   bellum	   field	   is	   between	  minimalist	  and	  maximalist	  approaches,	  a	  distinction	  that	   turns	  on	  whether	  one	  apportions	   minor	   or	   extensive	   responsibilities	   to	   victors	   for	   the	   vanquished:	  ‘Minimalists	   envisage	   jus	   post	   bellum	   as	   a	   series	   of	   restraints	   on	   what	   it	   is	  permissible	   for	   victors	   to	   do	   once	   the	   war	   is	   over.	   	   By	   contrast,	   maximalists	  argue	   that	   victors	   acquire	   certain	   additional	   responsibilities	   that	   must	   be	  fulfilled	  for	  the	  war	  as	  a	  whole	  to	  be	  considered	  just’.40	  	  May	  claims	  that	  the	  key	  question	  for	  jus	  post	  bellum	  theorists	  is	  ‘what	  difference	  should	  there	  be	  between	  victors	   and	   vanquished	   in	   terms	   of	   post	   war	   responsibilities?’41	   	   Finally,	  Mollendorf	   submits	   that	   the	   function	  of	   jus	  post	  bellum	   theory	   is	   to	   clarify	   ‘the	  limitations	   on	   the	   terms	   that	   a	   victorious	   warring	   party	   can	   impose	   on	   the	  vanquished’.42	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Louis	  V.	  Iasiello,	  ‘Jus	  Post	  Bellum:	  The	  Moral	  Responsibilities	  of	  Victors	  in	  War’,	  Naval	  War	  College	  Review	  LVII:3/4	  (2004),	  p.	  40.	  40	  Bellamy,	  ‘The	  Responsibilities	  of	  Victory’,	  p.	  602.	  41	  Larry	  May,	  After	  War	  Ends:	  A	  Philosophical	  Perspective	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  p.	  1.	  42	  Darren	  Mollendorf,	  ‘Jus	  Ex	  Bello’,	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	  16:2	  (2008),	  p.	  130.	  	  Other	  jus	  post	  bellum	  specialists	  also	  devote	  much	  of	  their	  analysis	  to	  parsing	  the	  post-­‐war	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  victors	  in	  war.	  	  C.	  A.	  J.	  Coady,	  Morality	  
and	  Political	  Violence	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  p.	  276.	  	  Bass,	  ‘Jus	  Post	  Bellum’,	  p.	  412.	  	  George	  R.	  Lucas,	  ‘Jus	  Ante	  and	  Post	  Bellum:	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   Within	  this	  framing,	  the	  character	  of	  victory	  achieved	  in	  any	  given	  war	  is	  held	  to	  matter	  insofar	  as	  it	  impacts	  upon	  the	  prospects	  for	  establishing	  a	  durable	  peace:	   the	   more	   legitimate	   the	   victory,	   the	   better	   the	   chances	   are	   that	   a	  sustainable	   peace	   will	   ensue.	   	   It	   is	   in	   this	   spirit	   that	   Brian	   Orend	   argues	   that	  victories	  marked	  by	  a	  draconian	  spirit	  pave	  the	  way,	  not	   for	  reconciliation,	  but	  for	  recrimination	  and	  further	  hostilities.	   	   ‘We	  know’,	  he	  writes,	   ‘that	  when	  wars	  are	  wrapped	  up	  badly,	  they	  sew	  the	  seeds	  for	  future	  bloodshed’.43	  	  Conversely,	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  have	  cited	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  commanders	  of	  the	  Union	  Army	  in	   the	   US	   Civil	   War	   as	   an	   example	   of	   how	   humility	   in	   victory—exactly	   what	  Schuck	   alleges	   was	   absent	   in	   the	   US	   in	   1991—can	   play	   a	   pivotal	   role	   in	  facilitating	   peace.	   	   The	   magnanimity	   displayed	   by	   General	   Ulysses	   Grant	   at	  Appomattox	   is	  often	  cited	  as	  a	  case	  of	  best	  practice.44	   	  Grant	  and	  his	  men,	   it	   is	  averred,	   understood	   that	   bad	   winners	   create	   sour	   losers,	   and	   they	   tempered	  their	   behaviour	   accordingly.	   	   Other	   scholars	   have	   remarked	   that	   it	   is	   not	   only	  
bad	  winners	   that	   hinder	   peacemaking.	   	   Citing	   Afghanistan,	   Eric	   Patterson	   has	  argued	  that	  unconvincing	  winners	  also	  cause	  problems.	   	  The	   inability	  of	   the	  US	  and	   its	  allies	   to	   ‘obliterate’	   the	  Taliban	  and	  achieve	  a	   ‘complete	  victory’	  has,	  he	  observes,	  undermined	  all	  subsequent	  efforts	   to	  usher	   in	  a	  meaningful	  peace	  by	  creating	  a	  strategic	  environment	  conducive	  to	  festering	  hostilities.45	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Completing	  the	  Circle,	  Breaking	  the	  Cycle’,	  in	  Eric	  D.	  Patterson	  (ed.),	  Ethics	  
Beyond	  War’s	  End	  (Washington:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  2012):	  47-­‐64.	  	  43	  Brian	  Orend,	  ‘Justice	  After	  War’,	  Ethics	  &	  International	  Affairs	  16:1	  (2002),	  p.	  43.	  44	  David	  A.	  Crocker,	  ‘Ending	  the	  US	  Civil	  War	  Well:	  Reconciliation	  and	  Transitional	  Justice’,	  in	  Eric	  D.	  Patterson	  (ed.),	  Ethics	  Beyond	  War’s	  End	  (Washington:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  2012):	  145-­‐174.	  45	  Patterson,	  Ending	  Wars	  Well,	  p.	  174.	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   This	  intimate	  relationship	  between	  considerations	  of	  victory	  and	  jus	  post	  
bellum	   theorising	   should	   come	   as	   no	   surprise	   for	   the	   latter	   is	   rooted	   in	   the	  former.	  	  This	  is	  evidently	  true	  in	  a	  disciplinary	  sense.	  	  As	  a	  recent	  addition	  to	  just	  war	  thinking,	  jus	  post	  bellum	  analysis	  has	  its	  origins	  in	  the	  writings	  on	  victory	  by	  Schuck,	  Bellamy,	  and	  others.	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  jus	  post	  bellum	  is	  ostensibly	  an	  outgrowth	  of	   the	  broader	   interest	   in	   the	  ethics	  of	  victory.	   	  But	   the	  observation	  that	   jus	  post	  bellum	   is	   rooted	   in	  victory	   is	  also	   true	  conceptually.	   	  As	  a	  body	  of	  thought	  dedicated	  to	  guiding	  victors	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  post-­‐war	  obligations,	  it	  assumes	   the	   achievement	   of	   victory	   as	   its	   point	   of	   departure.	   	   That	   is	   to	   say,	  victory	   is	   posited	   as	   a	   threshold	   for	   the	   commencement	   of	   jus	   post	   bellum	  theorising.	   	  As	  a	  result	  of	   the	  combination	  of	   these	  disciplinary	  and	  conceptual	  factors,	   it	   is	  nigh	   impossible	   to	   find	  an	  article	  on	  the	   jus	  post	  bellum	   that	   is	  not	  peppered	  with	  references	  to	  victory.	  	  	  Herein	   lies	   the	   rub.	   	   Although	   the	   concept	   of	   victory	   pervades	   jus	   post	  
bellum	   analysis,	   and	   could	   even	   be	   described	   as	   ubiquitous	   to	   it,	   it	   is	   rarely	  interrogated.	   	  None	  of	  the	  sources	  cited	  thus	  far	  offer	  a	  convincing	  definition	  of	  what	   is	  meant	   by	   victory,	   nor	   do	   they	   unpack	   its	   normative	   dimensions.	   	   The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  because,	  despite	  its	  prominence	  in	  the	  literature,	  victory	  is	  not	  the	   central	   concern	   of	   conventional	   jus	   post	   bellum	   analysis.	   	   Rather,	   as	   David	  Rodin	   has	   pointed	   out,	   the	   majority	   of	   jus	   post	   bellum	   scholars	   are	   actually	  interested	  in	  discerning	  only	  what	  moral	  and	  legal	  principles	  should	  obtain	  after	  victory	  has	  been	  achieved	  and	  the	  transition	  to	  peace	  has	  already	  begun.46	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Rodin	  regards	  the	  task	  of	  devising	  principles	  to	  guide	  the	  pursuit	  of	  victory	  is	  neglected	  in	  jus	  post	  bellum	  analysis,	  and	  proposes	  a	  jus	  ad	  terminationem	  belli	  to	  address	  it.	  	  David	  Rodin,	  ‘Two	  Emerging	  Issues	  of	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum:	  War	  Termination	  and	  the	  Liability	  of	  Soldiers	  for	  Crimes	  of	  Aggression’,	  in	  Carsten	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   This	  should	  not	  be	  waved	  away	  as	  a	  mere	  lexical	  problem.	  	  The	  proclivity	  to	   treat	   victory	   as	   the	   point	   of	   departure	   for	   jus	   post	   bellum	   miscasts	   a	  substantive	   issue	   as	   a	   premise.	   	   If,	   as	   seems	   sensible	   to	   suppose,	   the	  determination	  of	  winners	  and	  losers	  is	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  endgame	  phase	  of	  war,	  rather	  than	  prior	  to	  it,	  our	  analytical	  framework	  should	  reflect	  this.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  manner	  by	  which	  a	  war	  is	  ended	  primes	  the	  prospects	  for	  a	  durable	  peace	  in	  its	  aftermath.	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  prevailing	  tendency	  to	  treat	  the	  category	  of	  victory	  as	  a	  given	  brackets	  the	  very	  questions	  we	  should	  be	  asking.	  	  Consider,	  for	   instance,	   the	   following	   statements	   by	   General	   Tommy	   Franks	   and	  Walzer.	  	  Interviewed	   in	   2006,	   Franks	   emphasized	   the	   importance	   of	   subjecting	   the	  concept	  of	  victory	  itself	  to	  scrutiny.	   	   ‘What	  constitutes	  victory?	  	  I	  think	  that	  is	  a	  fundamental	   question,	   and	   it	   is	   good	   for	   each	   of	   us	   in	   this	   country	   to	   ask	  ourselves	  that	  from	  time	  to	  time.	   	  When	  we	  try	  to	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  we’ve	  been	   victorious,	   we	   have	   to	   think,	   for	   just	   a	   second,	   what	   the	   term	   “victory”	  means’.47	  	  Six	  years	  later	  Walzer	  bypassed	  these	  concerns	  in	  an	  essay	  on	  jus	  post	  
bellum:	   ‘I	   am	   going	   to	  assume	   the	   victory	  of	   just	  warriors’,	   he	  writes,	   ‘and	   ask	  what	   their	  responsibilities	  are	  after	  victory’.48	   	  To	  assume,	  as	  Walzer	  and	  other	  just	  war	  scholars	  do,	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  winner	  and	  loser	  prefigures	  jus	  
post	   bellum	   analysis	   is	   to	   foreclose	   precisely	   the	   matters	   we	   should	   be	  interrogating—i.e.,	  how	  victory	  itself	  is	  understood,	  produced,	  and	  consolidated.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Stahn	  and	  Jann	  K.	  Kleffner	  (eds.),	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum:	  Towards	  a	  Law	  of	  Transition	  
from	  Conflict	  to	  Peace	  (The	  Hague:	  TMC	  Asser	  Press,	  2008):	  53-­‐77.	  	  This	  proposal	  has	  found	  some	  resonance	  in	  legal	  writings:	  Gabriella	  Blum,	  ‘The	  Fog	  of	  Victory’,	  
The	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  24:1	  (2013):	  391-­‐421.	  47	  General	  Tommy	  Franks,	  ‘The	  Meaning	  of	  Victory:	  A	  Conversation	  with	  Tommy	  Franks’,	  The	  National	  Interest	  86	  (November/December	  2006),	  p.	  8.	  48	  Michael	  Walzer,	  ‘The	  Aftermath	  of	  War:	  Reflections	  on	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum’,	  in	  Eric	  D.	  Patterson	  (ed.),	  Ethics	  Beyond	  War’s	  End	  (Washington:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  p.	  37.	  	  Emphasis	  added.	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At	  All	  Costs	  and	  in	  Spite	  of	  All	  Terror?	  Setting	  this	  critique	  of	  jus	  post	  bellum	  scholarship	  aside,	  there	  will	  nevertheless	  be	   those	  who	   counsel	   that	   victory	   should	   be	   treated	   as	   simply	   another	   one	   of	  those	   concepts—such	   as,	   for	   instance,	   the	   ‘balance	   of	   power’—that	   just	   war	  thought	  has	  no	  business	  addressing.	   	  This	   section	  explores	   this	  proposition.	   	   It	  surveys	   two	   arguments	   both	   for	   and	   against	   engaging	   the	   concept	   of	   victory	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  just	  war	  thought.	  	  The	  first	  reason	  for	  addressing	  victory	  within	  just	  war	  thought	  is	  that,	  no	  matter	  what	  we	  wish,	  victory	   is	  an	  essential	  concept	   that	  cannot	  be	  avoided	   in	  any	  discussion	  of	  military	  matters.	  	  It	  is	  so	  intimately	  connected	  to	  warfare	  in	  the	  popular	  imagination	  that	  the	  two	  often	  appear	  symbiotic.	  	  We	  may	  recall	  in	  this	  respect	   General	  MacArthur’s	   observation	   that	   the	   object	   of	  war	   is	   victory,	   but	  also	   Prime	   Minister	   Winston	   Churchill’s	   May	   1940	   speech	   to	   the	   House	   of	  Commons	  detailing	   the	  Allies’	   objectives	   in	  World	  War	  Two.	   	   ‘You	  ask,	  what	   is	  our	  aim?	  	  I	  can	  answer	  in	  one	  word:	  victory—victory,	  victory	  at	  all	  costs,	  victory	  in	  spite	  of	  all	  terror;	  victory,	  however	  long	  and	  hard	  the	  road	  may	  be;	  for	  without	  victory,	   there	   is	  no	  survival’.49	   	  Whether	  we	   like	   it	  or	  not,	   the	   idea	  of	  victory	   is	  deeply	   ingrained	   in	   the	   popular	   imaginary	   and	   not	   likely	   to	   be	   erased	   or	  forgotten	  anytime	  soon.	  	  It	  is	  too	  powerful	  a	  rhetorical	  motif	  to	  simply	  disappear	  or	   fade	   into	   desuetude.	   	   Additionally,	   any	   attempt	   to	   work	   around	   it	   is	   likely	  merely	  to	  re-­‐code	  it.	  	  The	  point	  here,	  then,	  is	  that,	  rather	  than	  pretending	  it	  does	  not	  exist,	  or	  simply	  steering	  around	  it,	  just	  war	  scholars	  should	  acknowledge	  the	  inescapability	  of	   the	  concept	  of	  victory	  and	  engage	   it	   in	  a	   constructive	   fashion.	  	  To	  do	  anything	  else	  would	  be	  to	  continue	  ignoring	  the	  elephant	  in	  the	  room.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Quoted	  in:	  Bond,	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Victory,	  p.	  142.	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   The	   second	   reason	   for	   pursuing	   this	   course	   is	   that	   if	   just	   war	   scholars	  turn	  away	  from	  victory,	  this	  would	  effectively	  mean	  surrendering	  this	  important	  concept	   to	   other	   actors,	   principally	   military	   strategists	   and	   planners.	   	   This	   is	  troubling	   because,	   as	  we	   have	   already	   noted	   in	   Section	  One,	   only	   a	   handful	   of	  these	  scholars	  incorporate	  a	  normative	  dimension	  into	  their	  accounts	  of	  victory	  in	  war.50	  	  As	  Heuser	  points	  out,	  this	  has	  had	  deleterious	  effects	  for	  how	  we	  think	  about	   winning	   wars,	   divorcing	   the	   pursuit	   of	   victory	   from	   the	   deeper	  considerations	   of	   justice,	   order,	   and	   peace	   that	   it	   necessarily	   evokes.51	  	  Accordingly,	  by	  encouraging	  just	  war	  scholars	  to	  engage	  with	  victory,	  a	  concept	  that	  is	  all	  too	  often	  viewed	  as	  the	  monopoly	  of	  hard	  headed	  military	  thinkers,	  we	  might	   both	   ameliorate	   these	   effects	   and	   furnish	   a	  meeting	   ground	   for	   scholars	  from	   these	   ostensibly	   rival	   camps.	   	   Employing	   the	   concept	   of	   victory	   as	   a	  bridgehead	  between	  normative	  and	  strategic	  modes	  of	  thought	  would,	  it	  follows,	  go	   a	   long	   way	   toward	   establishing	   a	   long	   overdue	   and	   potentially	   fruitful	  dialogue	  between	  the	  followers	  of	  Augustine	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  followers	  of	  Clausewitz	  on	  the	  other.	   	  This	  would	  presumably	  be	  beneficial	  for	  all	  parties.	  	  It	  would	  correct	  the	  tendency	  on	  the	  part	  of	  strategists	  to	  ignore	  the	  normative	  dimensions	  of	  conflict,	  while	  also	  nudging	  just	  war	  scholars	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  analysis	   both	   stakes	   of	   and	   connects	   to	   the	   animating	   logic	   of	  war,	   the	   kinetic	  relation	  between	  military	  means	  and	  political	  ends.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  For	  example,	  Colin	  Gray’s	  writings	  on	  victory	  almost	  completely	  bypass	  its	  normative	  element.	  	  Colin	  S.	  Gray,	  Defining	  and	  Achieving	  Decisive	  Victory	  (Carlisle,	  PA:	  Institute	  of	  Strategic	  Studies,	  2002).	  	  Also:	  Colin	  S.	  Gray,	  ‘Nuclear	  Strategy:	  The	  Case	  for	  a	  Theory	  of	  Victory’,	  International	  Security	  4:1	  (1979):	  54-­‐87.	  	  Exceptions	  to	  this	  rule,	  strategists	  who	  consider	  victory’s	  moral	  dimensions,	  include	  William	  Martel	  and	  Robert	  Mandel.	  	  Martel,	  Victory	  in	  War,	  p.	  3.	  	  Mandel,	  
The	  Meaning	  of	  Military	  Victory,	  pp.	  53-­‐69.	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Heuser,	  ‘Victory,	  Peace,	  and	  Justice’,	  p.	  7.	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   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	   are	   also	   good	   reasons	   for	   exercising	   caution	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   addressing	   the	   concept	  of	   victory	  within	   the	   just	  war	   rubric.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  victory	  presupposes	  a	  ludic	  or	  agonal	  conception	  of	  war.	   	   It	   is	  premised	  upon	  a	  view	  of	  war	  as	  akin	   to	  a	  game	  or	  bounded	  contest.	  	  Although	   once	   orthodox,	   this	   view	   of	   war	   elicits	   hardly	   any	   support	   in	   the	  modern	   era.52	   	   Rather,	   the	   view	   of	   war	   as	   game	   has	   provoked	   widespread	  disdain.	   	  War	   is	   not	   regarded	   as	   a	   contest	   that	   one	   side	   can	  win;	   it	   is	   instead	  viewed	  as	  a	  human	  tragedy.	   	  We	  have	  already	  commented	  upon	  this	  view	  as	   it	  has	  been	  expressed	  by,	  among	  others,	  Liddell	  Hart,	  and	  Briant,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  the	  dominant	  motif	   in	   the	  war	  memorials	   that	  are	  dotted	  across	   the	  hinterlands	  of	  Europe	  and	  North	  America.	   	  Studies	  of	   these	  memorials	  reveal	   that	   they	  rarely	  invoke	   victory.53	   	   Most	   memorials	   function	   instead	   as	   sites	   of	   mourning	   that	  testify	  to	  the	  ‘catastrophic	  character	  of	  war’.54	  	  We	  could	  add	  to	  this	  the	  views	  of	  novelists	   (like	  Kurt	   Vonnegut	   and	   Joseph	  Heller),	   journalists	   (Peter	  Maass	   and	  Chris	   Hedges),	   artists	   (Pablo	   Picasso),	   and	   poets	   (Wilfred	   Owen	   and	   Sigfried	  Sassoon).	   	   This	   medley	   of	   voices	   reflects	   the	   widely	   held	   view	   that	   it	   is	  inappropriate	   to	   think	   about	  war	   through	   the	   prism	  of	   victory	   for	   it	   lends	   the	  impression	   that	   war	   is	   a	   game	   that	   can	   be	   won	   when	   in	   fact	   it	   is	   properly	  understood	  as	  a	  disaster	  for	  all	  involved.	  	  This	  is	  a	  powerful	  chorus	  that	  just	  war	  scholars	  would	  be	  churlish	  to	  ignore.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  James	  Q.	  Whitman,	  The	  Verdict	  of	  Battle:	  The	  Law	  of	  Victory	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  
Modern	  War	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  pp.	  1-­‐3.	  53	  Alex	  King,	  Memorials	  of	  the	  Great	  War	  in	  Britain:	  The	  Symbolism	  and	  Politics	  of	  
Remembrance	  (Oxford:	  Berg,	  1998),	  p.	  176.	  	  Alan	  Borg,	  War	  Memorials:	  From	  
Antiquity	  to	  the	  Present	  (London:	  Leo	  Cooper,	  1991).	  	  	  54	  James	  M.	  Mayo,	  ‘War	  Memorials	  as	  Political	  Memory’,	  Geographical	  Review,	  78:1	  (1988),	  pp.	  62-­‐75.	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   The	   second	   and	   perhaps	   more	   fundamental	   issue	   is	   that	   the	   notion	   of	  victory	   sits	   uncomfortably	   alongside	   the	   value	   placed	   on	   restraint	   by	   just	  war	  scholars.	   	   Although	   the	   Greeks	   may	   have	   deployed	   a	   particular	   conception	   of	  victory	  to	  lock	  in	  jus	  in	  bello	  norms,	  victory	  can	  also	  be	  invoked	  to	  encourage	  the	  abrogation	   of	   the	   rules	   of	   war.	   	   Winning	   is	   all,	   the	   argument	   goes,	   and	   every	  means	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  it	  should	  be	  employed.	   	  Pragmatism	  is	  extolled	  and	  moderation	   derided.	   	   The	   issue	   is	   illuminated	   in	   a	   revealing	   passage	   from	  Sebastian	   Junger’s	   2011	   account	   of	   the	   activities	   of	   a	   US	   Army	   platoon	   in	  Afghanistan.	   	   He	   writes	   that	   the	   advent	   of	   military	   technologies	   (like	   the	  machine-­‐gun)	  transformed	  war	  from	  being	  an	  arena	  in	  which	  men	  demonstrated	  their	  prowess	  to	  a	  base	  form	  of	  mechanized	  slaughter.	  	  	  	   In	   wars	   of	   that	   nature	   soldiers	   gravitate	   toward	   whatever	   works	   best	  with	  the	  least	  risk.	  	  At	  that	  point	  combat	  stops	  being	  a	  grand	  chess	  game	  
between	   generals	   and	   becomes	   a	   no-­‐holds-­‐barred	   experiment	   in	   pure	  
killing.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   much	   of	   modern	  military	   tactics	   is	   geared	   toward	  maneuvering	   the	   enemy	   into	   a	   position	   where	   they	   can	   essentially	   be	  massacred	  from	  safety.	  	  It	  sounds	  dishonourable	  only	  if	  you	  imagine	  that	  modern	  war	   is	   about	   honour;	   it’s	   not.	   	   It’s	   about	  winning,	  which	  means	  
killing	  the	  enemy	  on	  the	  most	  unequal	  terms	  possible.55	  	  Redolent	  of	  Churchill’s	  account	  of	  Allied	  war	  aims	  in	  World	  War	  II—victory	  at	  all	  costs	  and	   in	  spite	  of	  all	   terror—what	   this	   illustrates	   is	   that	   the	   ideal	  of	  victory	  has	   the	   propensity	   to	   undercut	   the	   emphasis	   on	   rules,	   restraint,	   and	   right	  conduct	  that	  is	  so	  central	  to	  the	  just	  war	  ethos.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Sebastian	  Junger,	  War	  (New	  York:	  Twelve,	  2011),	  p.	  140.	  	  Italics	  added.	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Conclusion	  It	  can	  be	  asserted	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  victory	  is	  important,	  not	  adequately	  treated	  by	  just	  war	  scholars,	  and,	  as	  currently	  defined,	  a	  weak	  pivot	  or	  foundation	  for	  jus	  
post	   bellum	   analysis	   in	   particular.	   	   What	   can	   be	   said	   beyond	   this?	   	   What,	   for	  instance,	   does	   victory	  mean	   in	   respect	   of	   just	   war?	   	   Should	   just	   war	   scholars	  devote	  their	  time	  to	  developing	  an	  account	  of	  just	  victory?	  	  The	  answers	  to	  these	  questions	   are	   not	   clear.	   	   As	   this	   article	   has	   demonstrated,	   victory	   is	   a	  troublesome	   concept	  when	   applied	   to	  modern	  warfare.	   	   There	   is,	   it	   follows,	   a	  temptation	  to	  argue	  for	  either	  excising	  the	  concept	  of	  victory	  from	  the	  just	  war	  vocabulary,	   or	   bidding	   to	   refine	   it.	   	   As	   one	   might	   expect,	   both	   options,	   to	   a	  greater	   or	   lesser	   extent,	   cancel	   one	   another	   out.	   	   On	   the	   one	   side,	   scholars	  inclined	   to	  purge	   the	   concept	  of	   victory	   from	   their	   just	  war	  analysis	   should	  be	  mindful	  that	  their	  efforts	  will	  more	  than	  likely	  simply	  end	  up	  re-­‐coding	  it.	  	  On	  the	  other,	  scholars	  that	  lean	  toward	  developing	  victory	  as	  a	  substantive	  category	  of	  just	   war	   analysis	   ought	   to	   beware	   that	   this	   endeavour	   is	   likely	   to	   proliferate	  difficulties.	  	  	  	   This	  result	  should	  not,	  however,	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  impasse	  or	  dead	  end.	  	  Carefully	  observed,	   it	   can	  reveal	  a	   lot	  about	   the	   limits	  and	  potentialities	  of	   just	  war.	  	  How	  so?	  	  Asking	  questions	  about	  victory	  forces	  us	  to	  contemplate	  what	  just	  wars	   can	   and	   cannot	   achieve.	   	   In	   so	   doing,	   it	   compels	   us	   to	   confront	   the	  possibility	   that	   just	  wars	   can	   only	   rarely,	   if	   at	   all,	   yield	   victories	   in	   the	   fullest	  sense	   of	   the	   term.	   	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   only	   in	   the	  most	   exceptional	   circumstances	  could	   just	   wars	   produce	   a	   decisive—final	   and	   total—resolution	   to	   a	   conflict.	  	  Rather,	   the	   best	   that	   we	   can	   reasonably	   hope	   for	   from	   just	   wars	   is	   that	   they	  interdict	  egregious	  acts	  of	  wrongdoing.	  	  Accordingly,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  they	  are	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properly	  understood,	  not	  as	  an	  active	  means	  of	  promoting	  justice	  and	  advancing	  the	  good,	  or	  as	  something	  to	  be	  celebrated,	  but	  as	  a	  remedial	  instrument	  that	  can	  at	   best	   put	   a	   temporary	   halt	   to	   the	   commission	   of	   injustice	   and	   forestall	   the	  worst	  from	  coming	  to	  pass.	  	  Asking	  questions	  about	  victory,	  then,	  reminds	  us	  of	  the	  tragic	  character	  of	  just	  war.	  	  As	  Augustine	  well	  understood,	  but	  as	  too	  many	  contemporary	  just	  war	  theorists	  are	  wont	  to	  forget,	   just	  war	  is	  not	  only	  a	  balm	  rather	  than	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  ills	  of	  the	  world,	  it	  is	  also	  symptomatic	  of	  them.	  	   Our	   conclusion,	   then,	   is	   this.	   	   The	   notion	   of	   victory,	   understood	   in	   its	  fullest	  sense,	   is	  essential	   to	  but	  also	   in	  tension	  with	  the	   just	  war	  ethos.	   	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  ideal	  of	  victory	  is	  clearly	  presupposed	  by	  the	  idea	  of	  just	  war.	  	  For	  a	  war	   to	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	   just	  war	   it	  must	  be	  vital	   to	  win	   it,	  and	   it	  would	  be	  a	  non-­‐sequitur	   to	   think	  otherwise.	   	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  where	   the	   just	  war	  ethos	  emphasizes	   humility,	   temperance,	   restraint,	   and	   the	   value	   of	   limited	   and	  provisional	   objectives,	   the	   ideal	   of	   victory	   threatens	   to	   subvert	   this	   agenda	   by	  encouraging	   a	   dangerous	   ‘eyes	   on	   the	  prize’	   disposition	   that	   discounts	   respect	  for	  constraints	  in	  war.	  	  The	  threat	  is	  evident,	  for	  instance,	  in	  Churchill’s	  emotive	  statement	   that	   the	  Allied	  objective	   in	  World	  War	  Two	  was	   ‘victory	  at	   all	   costs,	  victory	  in	  spite	  of	  all	  terror’.	   	  If,	  then,	  the	  discussion	  of	  victory	  is	  unsettling,	  if	  it	  hits	   a	   nerve,	   this	   is	   because	   it	   presses	   directly	   and	   sharply	   upon	   an	  uncomfortable	   truth,	   namely	   that	   the	   very	   idea	   of	   just	   war	   presupposes	   but	  struggles	   to	   accommodate	   the	   notion	   of	   winning.	   This	   is	   not	   something	   that	  should	  be	   swept	  under	   the	   rug.	  Rather,	   it	   is	   something	   that	   should	  be	  alighted	  upon	  and	  openly	  debated,	  for	  it	  is	  precisely	  the	  question	  of	  what	  winning	  means,	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  win	  justly,	  that	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  Gaza,	  Libya,	  Iraq,	  and	  Afghanistan	  today.	  	  
